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Environmental Law:
Streamlining the Review of Proposed
Development Under the Environmental
Land and Water Management Act
BY

WILLIAM

L.

EARL,* WILLIAM TARR,** AND TIM SMITH***

Examining recent legislative and judicial changes in the
law governing proposed developments, the authors find that a
predominant trend has been the streamlining of the procedures
by which proposed developments are reviewed. Although ad-

ministrative efficiency and speedy review pose the risk of unchecked development, the authors suggest that the recent

changes in the law have adequately accommodated the competing goals of environmental protection and economic growth.
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INTRODUCTION

Developments in the law seldom cut neat channels. Rather, as
the needs of a free society ebb and flow, the law in turn adjusts to
fit those needs. Anyone attempting to note every revision or new
decision might well miss the general drift for all the twists and
turns. Environmental law draws upon administrative law, property
law, and constitutional law;' any development in these areas may
also affect environmental law. Furthermore, a state's regulation of
the environment arises in the context of federal environmental
protection. 2 The recent proliferation of developments in environmental law calls for careful focus to find trends. One such trend
has emerged from decisions s on the issue of when environmental
regulation becomes a compensable taking by the government. The
trend has also appeared in recent legislative amendments to the
Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act
(ELWMA)4 and in decisions on the standing of petitioners for formal entry into "binding letter" proceedings. The recent developments have tended to enhance administrative efficiency by removing or forbidding certain bars to speedy review of proposed
development, especially development of regional impact (DRI).6
1. Thus, the usual doctrines of administrative procedure and review (e.g., "standing"
requirements, or the rule requiring substantial competent evidence in the record for affirmance) apply to action taken by local governments and various state agencies under the numerous laws protecting the environment. Much of this article examines a question of constitutional and property law-the issue of when a state's exercise of police powers of regulation
becomes a compensable taking of private property.
2. See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West Supp. 1979);
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1970); Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7428 (West Supp. 1979).
3. E.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979); Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3441 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1981).
4. FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012-.12 (1981).
5. Peterson v. Florida Dep't of Community Affairs, 386 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980);
Suwannee River Area Council Boy Scouts of America v. State Dep't of Community Affairs,
384 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. Ist DCA 1980). For a discussion of these decisions and "binding letter"
proceedings, see notes 14-27 and accompanying text infra.
6. Section 380.06(1) of the Florida Statutes continues to define a development of regional impact as "any development which, because of its character, magnitude, or location,
would have a substantial effect upon the health, safety, or welfare of citizens of more than
one county." FLA. STAT. § 380.06(1) (1981).
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II.

ACCESS TO REVIEW

Although Florida lacks any constitutional provision that parallels the Federal Constitution's restriction of federal judicial power
to "cases" and "controversies, ' 7 Florida has developed a doctrine
of standing both through case law8 and by special statutes.' Standing is essentially a prudential limitation on citizens' access to
courts and agencies. This doctrine permits a court to refuse access
to a person whose vague or frivolous allegations of generalized
grievances do not persuade the court that it would face a real and
immediate dispute between parties then before it. 10 In 1980 the
Florida legislature granted standing to "any substantially affected"
person to challenge new rules of the state land planning agency."'
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the statutory
standing of any citizen to bring a private action to enjoin any violation of laws, rules, or regulations for the protection of the environment.12 But in two decisions' s the District Court of Appeal,
First District, announced restrictive requirements for standing to
seek formal entry into "binding letter" proceedings. The court thus
echoed the legislature's obvious concern for administrative efficiency in providing for speedy review of proposed development.
A.

Intervention in "Binding Letter" Proceeedings

Under ELWMA, a developer may seek a binding letter from
the state land planning agency, determining that his proposed development would not have regional impact, or for other reasons
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
8. E.g., Department of Administration v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972) (individual
taxpayer plaintiff need not allege special injury to have standing to bring action challenging
the constitutionality of appropriations under constitutional provisions limiting the legislature's taxing and spending powers); Brown v. Florida Chautauqua Ass'n, 59 Fla. 447, 52 So.
802 (1910) (plaintiff must allege special injury to have standing to bring action to enjoin
public nuisance).
9. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) (1979) ("[a] party who is adversely affected by final
agency action is entitled to judicial review.").
10. For a more extensive discussion of the development of Florida's doctrine of standing, see Dubbin & Dubbin, 1980 Developments in Florida Administrative Law: Access to
Review of Official Action, or "Standing" Under the Florida APA, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 815
(1981).
11. FLA. STAT. § 380.032(2)(b) (1981).
12. Florida Wildlife Fed'n v. State Dep't of Envt'l Regulation, 390 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1980).
13. Peterson v. Florida Dep't of Community Affairs, 386 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA
1980); Suwannee River Area Council Boy Scouts of America v. State Dep't of Community
Affairs, 384 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
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would not have to undergo full DRI review." Although such letters
"bind all state, regional, and local agencies, as well as the developer,"1 5 the statute expressly grants only the developer the right to
participate in the state land planning agency's process of reaching
that determination. Two recent cases's in the District Court of Appeal, First District, have held that ELWMA does not give third
persons an enforceable right to enter as formal parties into the
agency's "binding letter" proceedings and does not grant third persons standing to demand a formal hearing under section 120.5717 of
the Florida Statutes.
In Suwannee River Area Council Boy Scouts of America v.
State Department of Community Affairs,"8 the Council's apparently dilatory tactics undercut the argument for a liberal view of
standing for persons not named in the statutory provision on binding letters. The Council, which owned land adjoining the proposed
residential development, had pressed the local government's planning and zoning commission to withhold approval of the developer's plan until the state land planning agency (the Department
of Community Affairs) 1 9 determined whether the development
would have a regional impact. When the developer sought a binding letter of determination from the Department of Community
Affairs, the Council sent an attorney to the preapplication meeting
and subsequently called the Department about the proposal from
time to time. 0 The Council failed, however, to submit written
comments or factual information despite the Department's invitation to do so."1 Thus, the Council did not seek special status as an
14. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(4)(a) (1981). The statute provides a quick procedure for resolving a developer's doubt about "whether his proposed development would be a development
of regional impact, whether his rights have vested pursuant to subsection (18), or whether a
proposed substantial change to a development of regional impact concerning which rights
had previously vested would divest such rights." Id.
15. Id.
16. Peterson v. Florida Dep't of Community Affairs, 386 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA
1980); Suwannee River Area Council Boy Scouts of America v. State Dep't of Community
Affairs, 384 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
17. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1) (1981).
18. 384 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
19. Until 1979, this agency was the Division of State Planning; an amendment in 1979
created the Department of Community Affairs and transferred to it all the functions of the
former Division, changing the definition of state land planning agency in § 163.3164 of the
Florida Statutes from the Division to the new Department. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-190, §§ 4749.
20. 384 So. 2d at 1371.
21. Id. The Department (then called the Division) had provided by rule for the participation of third persons in the binding letter proceedings: "The Division may solicit and

19811

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

intervenor in the informal proceedings conducted by the Department. Instead, on the last day of the sixty-day statutory period 2
during which the Department could issue a binding letter, the
Council requested a formal hearing under section 120.57. Understandably, the Department denied the request for a formal hearing
on the ground that the Council lacked standing, and the district
court of appeal affirmed.2
Although one might conclude that the "bad facts" in Suwannee help explain that decision, the First District subsequently
4
held, in Peterson v. Florida Department of Community Affairs,
that even third persons who have filed timely petitions to intervene have no standing to participate as formal parties in binding
letter proceedings. The court in Peterson declared that persons
other than the developer "have no substantial interests that will be
determined or affected by the Department's issuance of a binding
letter, '2 5 since the letter will determine only the'issue "whether a
proposed development is a DRI, ' '2 e and since Peterson and the

other owners of land near the project failed to show "how or why a
finding that the [development] is a DRI would affect their homes
''
differently than the finding that the project is not a DRI. 11
Superficially, this latter point might appear to allow future petitioners to acquire standing to intervene in binding letter proceedings by specifically alleging the ways in which the issuance of a
binding letter could cause them special injury. But the Peterson
court pronounced that "[t]here is no legislative authority for
[third] persons to obtain standing in such proceedings.

' 28

The

court in Suwannee similarly stressed that the legislature had not
intended ELWMA "to provide a forum for parties whose cornaccept submissions from any other third persons who may possess factual information relevant to the Division's investigation of an application." FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 22F-1.16(3). The
council's failure to submit any factual information certainly could not justify its attempt to

turn this accelerated form of review into a formal adversary proceeding.
22. Before its amendment in 1980, FLA. STAT. § 380.06(4)(a) provided that the agency
had to issue a binding letter within 60 days of the developer's request. The amendment

changed this period to 30 days from the date of the Department's acknowledgement of receipt of a sufficient application. FLA.

STAT.

§ 380.06(4)(a) (1981). This change should en-

courage developers to submit adequate information with their initial request for a binding
letter (to get the full benefit of the potential reduction in waiting time for a response) and
thus should speed the issuance of binding letters.
23. 384 So. 2d at 1374.
24. 386 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).

25. Id. at 880.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 881.

28. Id. at 880.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:925

plaints focus on alleged detriment to activities they wish to conduct on adjoining land." 29 Both courts noted that individuals owning adjacent land affected by a potential development still have
the opportunity to raise objections at the local level.30 Since impacts on adjacent lands are local rather than regional, owners with
such special interests should seek redress from the local government, not the state land planning agency. This reasoning ignores
the strong possibility that a proposed development with both regional and local impacts might remain all but unknown to the general public when the developer requested a binding letter. Thus,
owners of adjacent land may well be in the best position to learn of
proposed development and raise timely objections. In Suwannee
River, the Couhcil's delay belied that supposition. Yet one may approve of the court's concern for increased administrative efficiency
without agreeing with the Department's and the Peterson court's
position that binding letters affect the rights only of the developer.
In Suwannee, the court did not expressly approve of this view,
but its holding that "third persons have no enforceable right...

to participate as formal parties in binding letter proceedings"3 1 depends on the same reasoning-that the statute names only the developer and the state land planning agency as parties to the proceeding.3 2 This argument loses force, however, in light of the
29. 384 So. 2d at 1374.
30. As the Peterson court stated: "A binding letter only determines whether a proposed
development is a DRI; it is not a permit to begin any development activity and does not
protect the developer from any state, federal, or local restrictions applicable to its development. It does not supplant any local requirements." 386 So. 2d at 880-81.
Note that § 380.07(2) of the Florida Statutes limits standing for an appeal of a DRI
development order to the Adjudicatory Commission. Only the developer, the owner, the regional planning council, and the state land planning agency have standing. Even after Peterson and Suwanee, however, if the courts take a similarly restrictive view of standing under §
380.07(2), an adjacent landowner should continue to have the right to petition a circuit
court for a writ of certiorari to review the purely local impacts of the order. The decision in
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 346 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 3d DCA
1977), does not preclude this course. That case merely required a mortgagee who stood in
the shoes of the owner (and therefore had standing under § 380.07(2)) to take an available
administrative appeal before pursuing judicial remedies, "to the extent that Section 380.07
• . .provides what [the Court] determined to [be] the uniform statewide procedure for reviewing development orders." Id. at 1054 (emphasis added). For purely local impacts local
remedies should continue, unpreempted by chapter 380.
31. 384 So. 2d at 1373.
32. See FLA. STAT. § 380.06(4)(a) (1981). In dictum, the First District had taken this
position in 1975, in Sarasota County v. Beker Phosphate Corp., 322 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1975) (parties other than those specifically enumerated in the statute have no right to
seek review of a development of regional impact order). Cf. Compass Lake Hills Dev. Corp.
v. State, 379 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (the Department and the developer are the only
parties involved) (dictum); South Fla. Regional Planning Council v. Florida Land & Water
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statute's provision that the agency's issuance of such a letter binds
"all state, regional, and local agencies, as well as the developer." 3
If residents of neighboring counties fail for whatever reasons to
submit adequate studies, reports, or other information during the
restricted period, the Department may well issue a letter that
removes the project once and for all from DRI review. This precludes the issue of regional impacts from being raised in proceedings before the local government. Thus, some property rights may
suffer for the sake of administrative efficiency and judicial economy. Much depends, then, on the Department's interpretation of
what constitutes a "sufficient application" s from a developer. The
court in Suwannee River cautioned that permitting "formal entry
of third persons into the binding letter proceeding . . . would so
delay and complicate the procedure as to" discourage. developers
from resorting to this accelerated processing of proposals for developments.3 5 Ultimately, however, the Department -retains the duty
to balance the interest in a speedy resolution and the need for an
accurate determination to protect the environment.
B.

Challenging the Adoption of New Rules

Although the courts have hesitated to allow standing when the
law does not expressly provide for it, the legislature has changed
the law to provide for standing in at least one instance. Under section 380.032(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes,"' the Department of
Community Affairs can promulgate rules to implement ELWMA.
In 1980, the Florida Legislature added subsection (2)(b)87 to proAdjudicatory Comm'n, 372 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (having failed to seek judicial
review of issuance of binding letter by Division of State Planning, Council had no standing
either to attack binding letter collaterally or to appeal Commission's denial of petition to
review subsequent development order (zoning resolution) approving the development); Sarasota County v. General Dev. Corp., 325 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (county had no
standing to appeal development order issued by city located within county, because city
alone was the local government with jurisdiction over the proposed development, as required for standing under FLA. STAT. § 380.11 (1979)).
33. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(4)(a) (1981).
34. Id. Of course, the Department's interpretation of sufficiency may be subject to review-but not at the instigation of mere neighbors of the proposed development. A substantial number of residents in the area, if united in their opposition to a project, might bring
about such review by exerting pressures on the local government with jurisdiction, which
would have standing to challenge the Department's ruling under Sarasota County v. General
Dev. Corp., 325 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). But this course still places too great a burden
on the general public to challenge the ruling.
35. 384 So. 2d at 1374.
36. FLA. STAT. § 380.032(2)(a) (1981).

37. Id. § 380.032(2)(b). New subsection (2)(b) reads as follows:

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
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vide that "any substantially affected party" may ask the Administration Commission 8 to review the Department's adoption of any
rule or, by implication, any modification of a rule that interprets
guidelines and standards that have been adopted by the Administration Commission and approved by the legislature. 9 This statutory grant of standing will enable persons such as a developer concerned about excessive restrictions on the use of his private
property, or a resident worried about the potential injury to his
property from new development (approved under permissive
rules), to delay the rule from taking effect. This is possible because
the initiation of review automatically stays the effectiveness of the
rule while the Commission takes up to forty-five days to consider
whether to adopt, amend, or reject the rule under review.40 Providing for such accelerated review of new rules, however, avoids requiring a challenge to arise in the context of a dispute between an
agency or a group of citizens committed to a cause and a developer
who has fully planned his development without knowing whether a
challenge to the rules might succeed in changing the framework for
the planning. The amendment thus increases the certainty of the
rules on which developers may base their planning and avoids the
possibility of much protracted litigation in the future. After all,
hard cases can make bad rules, too.
C.

Enjoining Pollution Under the Environmental Protection
Act

In Florida Wildlife Federation v. State Department of Environmental Regulations,4 1 the Supreme Court of Florida recently
(b) Within 20 days following adoption, any substantially affected party may
initiate review of any rule adopted by the state land planning agency interpreting the guidelines and standards by filing a request for review with the Administration Commission and serving a copy on the state land planning agency. Filing
a request for review shall stay the effectiveness of the rule pending a decision by
the Administration Commission. Within 45 days following receipt of a request
for review, the commission shall either reject the rule or adopt the rule, with or
without modification.

Id.
38. The Governor and the Cabinet sit as the Administration Commission in their capacity as promulgators of standards and guidelines under ELWMA. See id. § 380.031(1). In
their role as settlors of disputes over the granting or denial of permits, the Governor and the
Cabinet act as the Adjudicatory Commission. See id. § 380.07.
39. See id. § 380.06(4)(a) (providing for stricter legislative control over the adoption of
guidelines and standards).
40. Id. § 380.032(2)(b).
41. 390 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1980).
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upheld the statutory grant of access to the courts under the Environmental Protection Act (EPA). 4 ' This statute allows any citizen
of the state to bring an original action to enjoin violations of the
state's laws for protecting the environment," and provides for judicial review of any agency actions that allegedly cause unlawful
harm to the environment. In FloridaWildlife Federation,the Federation brought an action under the EPA against the State Department of Environmental Regulations and the South Florida Water
Management District, charging that the operation of a certain
spillway was polluting a canal and nearby waters used by federation members for recreational purposes. On appeal from a dismissal of the complaint for the Federation's lack of standing, the
Water Management District argued for affirmance on the ground
that in passing the EPA, the legislature had exceeded its powers by
abrogating the supreme court's "special injury rule of standing to
sue,""" thus infringing the "[c]ourt's power to adopt rules of prac4'5
tice and procedure.

The supreme court rejected this argument, holding first that
apart from its procedural requirements, the EPA also provides "an
entirely new cause of action" that grants a new substantive right
to the citizens of Florida to protect their environment. 4" Thus, the
42. See FLA. STAT. § 403.412 (1981).
43. E.g., Florida Coastal Management Act of 1978, FLA. STAT. §§ 380.21-.25 (1981);
Florida Water Pollution Control & Sewage Treatment Plant Grant Act of 1970, FLA. STAT.
§§ 403.1821-.1833 (1981).
44. Id. at 66. Under the court-made special injury rule, a person has no standing to
enjoin a public nuisance, to challenge zoning decisions, or to maintain a taxpayer's suit,
unless he can show that the challenged action has caused him some special "injury different
both in kind and [in] degree from that suffered by the public at large." Id. at 67; see, e.g.,
Brown v. Florida Chautauqua Ass'n, 59 Fla. 447, 52 So. 802 (1910) (clarifying and extending
equitable principle of granting relief to property owner injured by unlawful obstruction in
highway); Pinellas County v. Lake Padgett Pines, 333 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (private owner of land near well field supplying water to two counties could suffer special injury
of lowered level of water in lakes and wells on private owner's land, and therefore had
standing to challenge county's pumping of water from well field as not complying with the
requirements of chapter 380 of Florida Statutes).
45. 390 So. 2d at 65; see FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
46. 390 So. 2d at 66. The court contrasted this creation of a new cause of action to the
attempted statutory grant of standing to condominium associations to bring class actions on
behalf of their unit-owner members, which the court in Avila S. Condo. Ass'n. v. Kappa
Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977), rejected as an "impermissible incursion" into the court's
power to determine rules of procedure. The court in Avila South had recognized the value
of the statute's solution to the problem of providing affordable access to the courts for individual owners of condominium units, but invalidated the statute as a legislative attempt to
redefine proper parties in class actions ("ratherthan to set out substantive rights," said the
court in Florida Wildlife, 390 So. 2d at 67 (emphasis added)). The court concurrently
adopted the same solution as new FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b). 347 So. 2d at 608.
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EPA "is not an impermissible incursion into this Court's power" to
establish those procedural requirements.4 7 Second, and with apparent inconsistency, the court held that the special injury rule did
not apply to the new cause of action.
Before passage of the EPA, only citizens who could show a
special injury had standing to seek an injunction against a public
nuisance such as water pollution. The court correctly perceived
that the legislature could not have intended that its grant of a
cause of action to any citizen of the state would be subject to a
standing requirement that would annul the effect of creating a new
cause of action. Requiring a showing of special injury would leave
plaintiffs in the same position as before the passage of the EPA,
thereby rendering the statute meaningless. But one might wonder
why the court laid such stress on the proposition that the EPA
established new substantive rights rather than procedural rights, 48
since, as the court implicitly recognized, the sole right created by
the provision at issue had both the substantive effect of creating a
new cause of action and the procedural effect of abrogating the
special injury rule: "The district. . . contends that approval of the
statute should not extend to abrogating the special injury rule in
this instance. Again, we disagree because the legislature has manifested its intent that that rule of law not apply to suits brought
under the EPA." 49 This EPA provision simply carved out a cause
of action as an exception to the special injury rule. 0 The provision
necessarily invaded the court's exercise of its "power over practice
and procedure in the state's courts."5 1 In this context the distinction between substantive and procedural effects seems spurious.
The key to resolving this apparent confusion appears upon closer
scrutiny of the court's language: this provision is an incursion but
"not an impermissible incursion into [that] power. '5 2 Significantly,
the court noted that certain procedural requirements other than
the special injury rule will apply to actions under the EPA."
47. 390 So. 2d at 67.
48. Id. at 66-67; see note 46 supra.
49. Id. at 67.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 67-68. The court will require any plaintiff bringing an action under the EPA
to allege specific facts that support the necessary allegation of irreparable injury; moreover,
"it must appear that the question raised is real and not merely theoretical and that the
plaintiff has a bona fide and direct interest in the result." Id. at 68 (citing Miami Water
Works Local No. 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946)).
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The decision in Florida Wildlife federation qualifies, rather
than belies, the current trend of streamlining the process of reviewing proposed development. The court upheld the right to a
cause of action granted by the EPA54 and thus ensured the continued monitoring of developers' operations and agencies' actions by
concerned citizens acting as private attorneys general. But the decision establishes no new undercurrent against the main trend. Indeed, with the continued effectiveness of this basic safeguard ensured, the legislature and the courts may well feel justified in
further streamlining the laws, rules, and regulations that any citizen may enforce in an action under the EPA.
III.

A.

SMOOTHING THE REVIEW OF PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT

Land Use: Developments in the Law of Compensable
Takings

The significant recent decision in Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.,55 points out a problem in current Florida environmental
law. Although the legislature has been steadily working to streamline the permitting process, a developer still faces a long, sometimes even circular, path to the completion of a development. The
environmental permitting process, although necessary for adequate
protection of the land, must have a definite point of termination to
protect the public's interest in housing. In Graham v. Estuary
Properties, Inc., the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the District Court of Appeal, First District, and held that no taking had
occurred through denial of development approval under chapter
380 of the Florida Statutes. 56 After deciding that a taking had not
occurred, the supreme court sent the case back to the First District
for a remand to the agency so that, as mandated by statute, the
agency could tell the developer how to change its proposal to make
the development permissible.5 The decision indicates a keen
awareness of the necessity of protecting environmentally sensitive
lands, but it leaves several crucial questions unanswered.
In part because Estuary had been seeking approval of its DRI
for at least six years and now had to return to the same agency for
54. See FLA. STAT. § 403.413 (1981).

55. 399 So. 2d 1374 (1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3441 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1991). Editorial Note: Two of the authors, Mr. Earl and Mr. Tarr, worked on an amicus curiae brief
submitted in this case on behalf of Deltona Corporation.
56. FLA. STAT. § 380.012-.12 (1979).
57. 399 So. 2d at 1380.
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another round of evaluations, the First District concluded that a
taking had occurred when the hearing officer denied Estuary's application for a development without stating the changes necessary
for approval as required by the statute, "or any meaningful
changes in the proposed development that would enable [Estuary]
to make any economically beneficial use of its land.""6 The lower
court reached that conclusion in part to avoid the "unduly restrictive result" of exposing the "landowner to the treadmill effect of
repeated denials without any indication from governmental agencies of [such] changes." 59 At the time of the First District's decision, of course, Estuary had submitted just one application, and
the treadmill had circled only once. In taking away the government's option to modify its denial of any permit and allow Estuary
some development consistent with environmental protection, the
First District would have exacted a heavy penalty for apparent recalcitrance by the government, which the court construed as reflecting an intent to take Estuary's property in "a concerted determination to preserve the mangroves." 0 The court seemed to
overlook the changes specified by Lee County's development order
as necessary for the approval of Estuary's development. 61 Moreover, the court's prescription of a rigid all-or-nothing dichotomy of
remedies misinterpreted the federal and Florida case law on the
appropriate remedy for a state's imposition of excessive restrictions on private property" and ignored the flexible approach recently formulated by the Florida Legislature.6 3 Because courts in
various other jurisdictions 64 are beginning to recognize that government may turn the permitting process into a treadmill that deprives the developer of the use of his property for a substantial
58. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1139 (Fla. 1979), rev'd sub nor.

Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (1981).
59. Id. at 1137 (emphasis added).
60. Id. 1139.
61. Id. at 1130.
62. See cases cited at note 74 infra. One should note that the Court has shown reluctance to find that mere regulation has caused a taking. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). But see San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. See 1978 Fla. Laws Ch. 78-85 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 380.085 (1981)). Of course, §
380.085 did not control the resolution of Estuary Properties,since the case arose before the
passage of the statute. Nevertheless, the court was free to follow the policy implicit in §
380.085. The court apparently chose not to do so.
64. E.g., Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Envt'i Protection, 168 Conn. 349, 362
A.2d 948 (1975); Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 44 Md. App. 79, 407 A.2d 1151 (Ct.
Spec. App. 1979); Spears v. Berle, 48 N.Y.2d 254, 397 N.E.2d 1304, 422 N.Y.S.2d (1979); see
notes 199-210 and accompanying text infra.
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period, the decision of the First District in Estuary Properties is
noteworthy. Had the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the case,
it would doubtless have spawned numerous other challenges to denials of permits, both in Florida and in other states. At a minimum, that threat would have discouraged careless denials and excessive restrictions. But the policy against circular permitting may
point to a doctrine whose case has not yet come. On the facts of
record in Estuary Properties,at least, the supreme court properly
ignored the district court's remarks about a potential treadmill effect and reversed under the prevailing principles of takings law.
1.

THE TEST AND THE REMEDIES FOR A TAKING

Both the United States Constitution 5 and the Florida Constitution"6 forbid government from taking private property without
fair compensation to the owner. Since the fourteenth amendment
makes the federal Just Compensation Clause applicable to the
states,67 the Supreme Court of the United States often reviews
state cases involving the validity of claims that government has
taken private property, and thus has influenced state courts in
their formulation of tests for a taking. Accordingly, the federal and
the Florida approaches are similar, and recent Supreme Court decisions 68 can provide a framework for evaluating what remedies a
court should grant for a taking."
In general, a government 70 may accomplish a taking of private
property in any of several ways, some of which are unintentional. A
government may exercise its inherent power of eminent domain to
condemn and purchase private property.1 In Florida, the state
constitution requires the government to prove that the taking was
necessary for a public purpose,72 and a court needs no other test to
find a compensable taking when the government has voluntarily
65. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."
66. FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 6(a): "No private property shall be taken except for a public
purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner ...."
67. See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896).
68. E.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
69. See notes 90-127 and accompanying text infra.
70. A state or the federal government or any of a state's subdivisions, such as a county
or municipality, may appropriate private property to public use, subject to the Just Compensation Clause and its state equivalent.
71. See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
72. Ball v. City of Tallahassee, 281 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1973).
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commenced proceedings in eminent domain. Commonly, however,
government accomplishes a de facto taking, either through physical
action s or through regulation. 4 For example, a government may
carry out some valid function that has the collateral effect of damaging or trespassing upon private property.1 8 Government regulation may also deprive an owner of the only practical use for his
property, as in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon7 in which a statute forbade any mining of coal that would cause damage to streets
and houses from subsidence of the surface. The regulation in effect
precluded the owner of mineral rights from mining any coal and
therefore from making the only possible use of its property.
In the absence of statutes abrogating the government's sovereign immunity against tort suits, many courts have formulated a
remedy for property owners by extending the concept of compensable takings to cover de facto confiscation," as well as eminent
domain. Through the device of "inverse condemnation, 7 8 a court
73. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (easement taken by frequent and
regular low overflights); State Road Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941) (destruction of profitability of mill because of flooding from new bridge and fill).
74. The Supreme Court recognizes the possibility of such taking by regulation: e.g.,
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (dictum); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding). Florida courts have limited the remedy
for confiscatory regulation to a declaration of its invalidity and an injunction against its
enforcement. This eliminates the need to find a compensatory, permanent taking. See, e.g.,
Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979) (no recovery under de
facto taking theory for mere consequential damages not caused by physical intrusion); Weir
v. Palm Peach County, 85 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1976) (same); Selden v. City of Jacksonville, 28
Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891) (same); Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614
(Fla. 4th DCA 1973), cert. denied, 293 So. 2d 717 (Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974)
(expressly rejecting possibility of recovering damages for taking from mere passage of zoning
regulations).
For an indication that the Court may be ready to uphold the availability of a third
remedy (interim damages) for a temporary taking by regulation, see note 79 infra, discussing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
75. See note 73 supra.
76. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
77. See, e.g., State Road Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868, 869 (1941) (explaining that sovereign immunity cannot prevent recovery for an unconstitutional taking). In a
recent decision the First District turned to the tort theory of continuing nuisance to support
its affirmance of injunctive relief, in the absence of facts to sustain a ruling that recurrent
flooding caused by road ditching already completed before the present owner had bought
the property could amount to a taking of this owner's property. Department of Tranp. v.
Burnette, 384 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (noting the recent abrogation of sovereign
immunity in Florida, under FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1979)).
78. In contrast to proceedings in eminent domain, which the government initiates to
condemn property, "inverse condemnation" is a remedy in an action brought by an owner of
private property to compel the government to pay compensation for the property it has
already taken in fact. For other discussions of the applicability of inverse condemnation to
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can find that the government has taken the property and therefore
must pay for the taking. The remedy for confiscatory conduct by
the government, however, is not always compensation. When a
court determines that a taking has occurred, it may order the government to restore the owner's beneficial use of his property, if
possible." But perhaps because the government's failure to exerregulation with reversible confiscatory effects, see Cookston & Bruton, Zoning Law, 35 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 581 (1981); Note, Inverse Condemnation:Its Availability in Challenging the
Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1439 (1974).
79. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (requiring compensation); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (denied injunction sought to enforce the
statute; dictum recognized the usual alternative remedy for taking by regulation-conditional declaratory and injunctive relief against the invalid regulation, with the
option left to the state to validate the regulation by commencing eminent domain proceedings to pay for the taking: "When [regulation has caused a taking], in most if not in all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act." 260 U.S.
413).
Even if the invalidation of a statute or other regulatory conduct of the government
restores the owner's beneficial use of his property, however, the owner may have suffered
substantial damages during the time when the government's conduct has temporarily taken
his property. In San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), five
Justices indicated that they would permit such an owner to recover interim damages for a
temporary taking. A majority of the Court dismissed the appeal because an apparent lack of
finality in the judgment deprived the Court of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). In
dissent, however, Justice Brennan reached the merits and argued for the availability of interim damages. Three Justices joined his dissent, and Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurring opinion that if the Court had had jurisdiction over the case he "would have [had]
little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brennan." 450 U.S. at 636.
In San Diego Gas, after a nonjury trial found liability for a taking, a jury awarded more
than three million dollars in inverse condemnation damages. The company had alleged that
about one-half of its property, lying within or near an estuary on the Pacific Ocean, was
taken by (1) the downzoning of a portion of the property, (2) the adoption of an open space
element of the city's general plan, and (3) the placing on the ballot of a bond issue for
acquisition of a piece of property (and other owners' properties as well; the bond issue
failed). 450 U.S. 624-31. The trial court concluded that because the downzoned property
proposed for acquisition had thereby become "unmarketable," the city had taken the property and must pay just compensation. Following an initial affirmance by the California
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, the trial court's ruling on liability and remedy were later
reversed by the same court of appeal on orders of the state supreme court in light of its
recently announced opinion in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 366, 598 P.2d 25, 157
Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In Agins, the state court had held that a
zoning ordinance permitting the construction of five residences on the plaintiff's land had
not constituted a taking because the ordinance had not deprived the company of substantially all beneficial use of the property. Moreover, the California Supreme Court had limited
the remedy to invalidation (rather than damages), even when a regulation did deprive an
owner of substantially all reasonable use of his land.
On remand, the court of appeal stressed this limitation on the remedy, declaring that
the company's exclusive "remedy is mandamus or declaratory relief, not inverse condemnation." 101 S.Ct. at 1292 (quoting from the unpublished opinion). Thus, the court of appeal
reversed its earlier decision, and the state supreme court denied review. Because a majority
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cise its power of eminent domain raises an implicit presumption
that government did not intend to take the property, the courts
have carefully tested the factual basis for claims of de facto takings
and have fostered the policy of requiring the government to "buy"
the property only in the clearest cases of de facto confiscation.8 0

Spectrum Analysis. Courts are least likely to find a taking
when the government action that injures private property rights is
merely regulatory, unaccompanied by any physical trespass on the
of the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted the court of appeal's opinion as
permitting further proceedings in the case, the Court held that the court of appeal had not
yet rendered an appealable final judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Consequently, the Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction and avoided reaching the taking issue.
Commentators have already begun construing the case as more or less a clarion call for
a case in which the Court will uphold the awarding of temporary damages in an action for
inverse condemnation. See, e.g., Hagman, Comment, 6 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 5 (May
1981); Kanner, Comment, 6 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 8 (May 1981). Justice Rehnquist's
pointed agreement with the four dissenters who reached the merits suggests as much at first
glance. The decision in San Diego, however, remains ambiguous. The majority quoted the
lower court's findings and conclusions on the taking issue at great length, as though sympathizing with the company's plight. Yet the majority of the Justices went out of their way not
to find finality of judgment. At the least, this bespeaks their deep reluctance to embrace the
sensible but novel remedy of interim damages except in the clearest case. Prediction also
seems premature when the Court's composition threatens to change rapidly within the near
future. Already one of the dissenters (Justice Stewart) has retired, and his replacement
(Justice O'Connor) may side with the San Diego majority on this issue. The Court may have
an opportunity to resolve the matter very soon. See Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643
F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981) (following the dissenters in San Diego); note 82 infra.
80. Note that even if the government has not intended to take the affected property, a
court may find that the effects of the government's regulatory conduct have taken the property. No conscious intention or implied promise to pay is necessary. See, e.g., San Diego Gas
& Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 n.21 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947).
Professor Tribe notes three tests for such a taking: "Physical Takeover, Destruction of
Value, and Innocent Use." TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 459 (1978). Tribe illustrates the "innocent use" test by elaborating on an explanation of the Court in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926): " '[A] nuisance may be merely a right
thing in a wrong place, like a pig in a parlor instead of the barnyard'-even if the parlor has
come to the pig rather than the other way round." TRIBE at 462.
Professor Michelman has identified four such tests for a taking: (1) whether the government's action has physically invaded the property; (2) the degree to which the action has
diminished the value of the property; (3) whether the government's action has produced
social benefits that outweigh the injuries to private ownership caused by the action; and (4)
whether the law merely regulates private conduct to prevent social harms, or instead seeks
to gain positive benefits for society from the restricted use of the private property.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). Michelman's third test really
subsumes his second and fourth tests and parallels this article's discussion of the Court's
balancing approach. See, e.g., notes 97-103 and accompanying text infra. It is such balancing of burdens and benefits that in the Court's practice links the two factors listed separately by Tribe as his second and third tests. See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L. REV. 36, 61-62 (1964), discussed in note 81 infra.
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property.8 1 In exercising its police power of regulation to protect
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, a government may

impose reasonable, necessary, and uniform restrictions on private
property without having to compensate landowners, even though
an extensive deprivation of the beneficial use of their property has

occurred. 2
Some casess suggest, however, that an otherwise valid action
may pass beyond mere regulation to the point of taking property
in the constitutional sense. Both the language 4 and the results" in
81. E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Forde v.
City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941). At the threshold, of course, the
government must show that it had a rational basis for the regulation, related to a constitutionally permissible purpose. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980);
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928). Actions by an administrative agency,
moreover, must lie within the scope of its statutory authority under a proper delegation
from the legislature. See, e.g., Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978). If
an action passes this qualitative, definitional test of a valid regulation, then a court would
undertake a second level of analysis of the government's action, essentially a quantitative
weighing of several factors. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 130; note 80 supra.
82. E.g., Goldblatt v. City of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928); Florida cases cited at note 69 supra. Other cases shift the emphasis: a taking occurs if regulatory conduct of the government creates a substantial or burdensome interference with the use and enjoyment of property. See, e.g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Benenson v.
United States, 548 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1977). In Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cited Agins and Penn Central for the principle
that an owner suffers a regulatory taking if a zoning "ordinance denies the owner an economically viable use of his land." Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1197 (5th
Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit then applied the reasoning of the dissenters
in San Diego, reversed a summary judgment for the city, and held that the landowner could
seek interim damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), in "an amount equal to just compensation for the value of the property during the period of the taking." Id. at 1200.
83. E.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 1; Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594; Pennsylvania Coal,
260 U.S. at 413; Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Nay. Control Auth., 171 So. 2d 376, 381
(Fla. 1965); Northcutt v. State Road Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
84. For example, many cases and comments quote the following language of Justice
Holmes:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without payment for every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation
must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact
for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution.
When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question
depends upon the particular facts.
The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413, 415 (Holmes, J.).
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these cases suggest a kind of spectrum analysis, or continuum theory," that can help to explain the approach of state and federal
The inference that in some cases the quantitative measure of the injury to property
may suffice to establish a taking retains vitality in the current approach of the Court. For
example, in Penn Central the Court noted that "a use restriction on real property may
constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
purpose . . . or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property." 438 U.S. at 127. The Court's reasoning in Kaiser Aetna and in Agins suggests that the
determination of what constitutes "an unduly harsh impact" may involve qualitative analysis as well as quantitative measuring. Thus, categorizing the asserted deprivation as "the
best use" of the property or a "fundamental attribute of ownership" may swing the balance
toward requiring compensation. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262. Or it may not, because of other
factors entering the balance, For example, the Agins opinion emphasizes that in determining the validity of zoning regulations, the Court must consider the benefits from the regulation shared by the private owners and the general public, "along with any diminution in
market value that the [private owners] might suffer." Id. The diminution-in-value test,
then, like the other tests discussed in note 75 supra, is but one factor in the Court's overall
approach.
85. See notes 73-74 supra.
86. Cf. Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus, 8
SANTA CLARA LAW. 1, 28 (1967) (cautioning that the notion of a "legal continuum" of takings
cases arranged by degrees of impact on private property is a mere "description of results"
rather than a test, failing to account for the role of policies or of qualitative differences in
the interests asserted by government in each case).
Similarly, Professor Sax has criticized the traditional tests as unworkable and thus uncertain in predictive value. In particular, Sax rejects both the formalism of the elder Harlan
(based on "traditional [qualitative] legal concepts") and the purely quantitative approach
suggested by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal but not followed by Holmes himself.
Sax, supra note 80, at 37. Sax goes on to propose his own qualitative test for a taking:
The precise rule to be applied is this: when an individual or limited group in
society sustains a detriment to legally acquired existing economic values as a
consequence of government activity which enhances the economic value of some
governmental enterprise, then the act is a taking, and compensation is constitutionally required; but when the challenged act is an improvement of the public
condition through resolution of conflict within the private sector of the society,
compensation is not constitutionally required.
Id. at 67. Sax thus distinguishes between government's role as a mediator (resolving the
claims of competing neighbors, by noncompensable regulation) and its function as an "enterpriser" (actively, though not necessarily commercially, competing with private individuals
for resources, and having to compensate owners for taking resources belonging to them). For
example, under Sax's rule, if a county makes road improvements that cause flooding of some
private property, the county has acted as an enterpriser in direct competition with the owners of the affected property and must pay compensation.
One may question the predictive value of Sax's own proposed qualitative test, Sax's
concept of governmental "enterprise" really embodies just one policy value (the unfairness
of permitting the government to compete with an individual, absent compensation) and ignores the role of other policies in determining whether a taking has occurred-i.e., whether
the government ought to pay for its action. This leads Sax to urge that the Court decided
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co. wrongly, despite recognizing that in Central
Eureka, the government's "order shutting the mines was designed to force the miners into
essential war work." Id. at 71 (commenting on United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,
357 U.S. 155 (1858)). Rather than recognize the validity or the overriding importance of the
policy of preserving the government's extraordinary war powers free from the chilling effect
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courts in determining whether a taking has occurred. A wide band
at one end of the spectrum represents cases of valid, noncompensable regulation. At the other end of the spectrum lies the band of
cases in which government has either commenced condemnation
proceedings or permanently invaded or destroyed property, s in
the absence of overriding public necessity such as the exigencies of
war"8 or the survival of a significant part of the state's economy. 9
(The presence of overriding exigencies so colors the judicial view of
the validity of government action that a court would likely see any
such action as falling within the band of noncompensable regulation). Shading away from the band of clear cases for compensation
is a band of cases in which government action has caused reversible physical effects (e.g., excessive noise from low overflights" or
flooding caused by road improvements)"1 on private property,9e
substantially depriving the owner of its beneficial use. In these
cases the courts allow government the option of either ceasing the
offensive activity or condemning and paying for the property
of requiring compensation in such a case, Sax omitted any application of his test to United
States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952), in which the Court refused to hold that the government had taken certain oil depots that the army had completely destroyed to prevent their
capture .by the Japanese during World War II.
The "spectrum analysis" of the present article seeks to avoid the pitfalls of either a
purely qualitative conceptualism or a purely quantitative continuum by combining the two.
Calling the continuum a spectrum is more than a mere metaphor or relabelling. By taking
account of such policies as discussed in Van Alstyne, supra, at 31-36, and by interrelating
these policies to certain qualitative categories of takings and to the triggering of other qualitative classifications by quantitative effects, spectrum analysis helps to explain and to chart
the consistency of the Court's overall balancing approach. (A chart for each individual Justice, though lying beyond the scope of this article, would undoubtedly improve the predictability of the Court's decisions on the taking issue.) Spectrum analysis is also more than
mere description. As a rule founded in the usage of the Supreme Court, this mode of relational analysis gains clarity from the image of a spectrum, but transcends it. As a mode of
analysis used by the Court, it attains prescriptive effect for lower courts whose decisions
face Supreme Court review, and it holds potential predictive value for lawyers.
87. E.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (recurrent floodings); State Road
Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 868 (1941) (flooding of millrace).
88. E.g., United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (destruction of oil depots in Phillipines to prevent enemy capture held not a taking).
89. E.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destruction of ornamental cedars to
save apple orchards from cedar rust held not a taking).
90. E.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965).
91. E.g., State Road Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941). Cf. United States
v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) (water project caused taking by flooding).
92. Of course, if the government action deprives the plaintiff of a use to which he has
no vested right, the government has not taken his property. See, e.g., Village of Tequesta v.
Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663, 670-71 (Fla. 1979) (plaintiff "owner" had not yet received statutorily required permit to use water taken by Village).
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affected."
The availability of these alternative remedies depends on the
possibility and desirability of reversing the confiscatory action of
the government. That policy determination requires a weighing of
the costs and benefits to the public and to the private owners involved.9" Abutting this band of cases of reversible government action are cases in the upper end of the spectrum in which the alleged taking derives solely from regulation. 8 Quantitative
distinctions may trigger a qualitative classification here. By measuring the degree of deprivation of property interests caused by a
regulation, a court may find that a regulation has reversibly
"taken" the property and hold the regulation invalid to avoid that
effect.9 Alternatively, the government may pay the price that is
constitutionally required to validate the regulation by compensating each affected owner. But the important point is that courts
have hesitated to order an unconditional award of damages in inverse condemnation for such an easily reversible taking.
Recent Cases. Although one may push the metaphor too far,
this spectrum analysis does help to illuminate the way in which
takings cases have combined qualitative and quantitative factors
into one consistent method of determination. In Penn Central
93. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (remanding to determine
whether taking was permanent, and if not, then limiting the damages to a temporary easement); State Road Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941) (affirmed injunction to
compel removal of road fill causing flooding of millrace, or else to commence proceedings in
eminent domain).
94. E.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980). See notes 208-210 and
accompanying text infra.
95. E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Forde v.
City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941).
96. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Forde v. City of Miami
Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941); Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So.
2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), cert. denied, 293 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
844 (1974) (expressly rejecting possibility of recovery of damages from mere passage of zoning regulations). But see San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981) (apparently five Justices favored awarding interim damages in inverse condemnation); Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (1981) (suggesting that compensation may be allowed in some instances). For a thorough discussion of the proper remedy in
the specific context of zoning, see Cookston & Bruton, supra note 78. See also Hernandez v.
City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981).
97. The metaphor also suggests that the proper remedy for a reversible taking by regulation must depend on this same interplay of qualitative classifications and quantitative
evaluation, reflected in the related color and position of a band in the spectrum. Policy may
so color certain kinds of factors (e.g., physical intrusion) that by themselves they qualify
government action as a "taking," in the absence of sufficiently countervailing policies that
give the action a contrary shading. Moreover, differences in degree, increased far enough,
become differences in kind, coloring the Court's view of whether government action fairly
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TransportationCo. v. City of New York, 98 the Supreme Court of
the United States discussed its general approach as focusing on
"several factors that have particular significance" in the "essentially ad hoc, factual" evaluation of circumstances to determine
whether an action of the government amounts to a taking." In
considering "[tihe economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,"10 0 the Court
must measure the degree of economic harm to the property as a
whole, thereby applying quantitative analysis. 101 In examining "the
character of the governmental action," with a physical invasion
more likely to result in the finding of a taking than would a regulatory interference that simply adjusted "the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good,"10 the Court must
draw qualitative distinctions as well. The overall approach "focuses . . .on the [qualitative] character of the action and on the
nature and the [quantitative] extent of the interference with [the
1 03
landowner's] rights.
The mesh of qualitative and quantitative factors appears again
in two Supreme Court cases decided last term. In Kaiser Aetna v.
United States,'0 ' the lessors of Kuapa Pond in Hawaii dredged a
preexisting channel (increasing its average depth from two to six
feet) to provide access to the pond from Maunalua Bay and the
Pacific Ocean; the Corps of Engineers had assented to the lessors'
plans. The lessors also raised the clearance level of a bridge to perrequires compensation. Of course, policies color each Justice's view, though differently: General analysis of the decisions produces an abstract spectrum of the approach of "the Court";
precise prediction must depend on the charting of each Justice's particular approach.
98. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (involving a "takings" challenge to New York City's Landmarks
Preservation Law).
99. Id. at 124.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 130-31. This includes consideration of offsetting benefits, such as the transferrable development rights granted by the city here, that reduce the overall impact on the
regulated property. See note 103 infra.
102. Id. at 124.
103. Id. at 130. In Penn Central the Court emphasized that although the Commission's
denial of plaintiffs' application precluded its constructing a high-rise building on the site of
the designated landmark (Grand Central Station), it could still transfer the development

rights for that site "to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal," id. at 137, and
could continue to receive a "reasonable return" on their operation of the Terminal itself. Id.

at 136. Thus, the Court concluded that no taking had occurred; that the Landmark Preservation Law imposed only "restrictions ...substantially related to the promotion of the
general welfare" (a permissible purpose) and provided opportunities to use and even im-

prove the Terminal site as well as other nearby properties. Id. at 138.
104. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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mit boats to pass under the highway on the barrier beach that isolated the pond from the ocean. Kaiser Aetna then completed the
development of a large marina, in which the company leased waterfront lots and through which the company controlled all access
to and from the ocean. The Corps later insisted that the developers
could not deny "public access to the pond because, as a result of
the improvements, it had become a navigable water of the United
States,"1 05 subject to the "navigational servitude" of the government to protect navigation, under the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
The Court rejected the government's argument "that the navigational servitude creates a blanket exception to the Takings
Clause,"0'e and noted that if Congress did choose to exercise its
power under the Commerce Clause to "assure the public a free
right of access to the Hawaii Kai Marina," the regulation might
amount to a compensable taking.0 Furthermore, the Court used
language of degree in concluding that the government's assertion
of power here, "the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right," 08 a property interest
"that has the law back of it to such an extent"'' 0 that a court
should classify it as one of the "interests that the Government cannot take without compensation."" 0 Thus, quantitative considerations contributed to the Court's classification of the disputed right
of access as an infringement of the marina's protected property interest (the right of exclusion). That qualitative determination in
turn tipped the overall balance in favor of private interests and
against the government's proposed imposition of an easement ("an
actual physical invasion") that would not "cause an insubstantial
devaluation of petitioners' private property.""'
The Court's recent decisions had thus restated and clarified its
overall balancing approach by the time the district court of appeal
105. Id. at 168.
106. Id. at 172.

107. Id. at 174-75. Whether the regulation would amount to a taking would ultimately
depend on the outcome of the Court's inquiry, described in terms that closely parallel the
language used Penn Central.
108. Id. at 179-80 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).

110. Id. at 180.
111. Id. (emphasis added). The three Justices in dissent likewise applied a test that
balanced public and private interests, id. at 188, but suggested that the government's "paramount power" to regulate navigation, id., outweighed these private property interests. Id.
at 190-91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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1
decided Estuary Properties.
In 1980 the Supreme Court again
applied an explicit balancing test in Agins v. City of Tiburon'1 5 to
determine whether the "mere enactment of [certain] zoning ordinances constitute[d] a taking,"1 14 paralleling the issue in Estuary
Properties whether denial of approval for a DRI of the scope requested by the developer could amount to a regulatory taking. 16
First, the Court in Agins restated the general principle that a zoning restriction "effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests"1 1 6 or if it "denies an owner economically viable use of his land. 11 7 Then, after reiterating
its settled position that "no precise rule" 11 8 distinguishes compensable takings from noncompensable regulations, the Court noted
that this determination "necessarily requires a weighing of private
and public interests."1 1 9
Because the appellants had not yet even applied for a permit
to develop their property, the issue before the Court was not a concrete application of a zoning ordinance but instead whether the
passage of a restrictive ordinance had already so burdened the appellants' property as to constitute a taking. The zoning ordinances,
enacted (as required by a new California statute)1 20 after the appellants had acquired their property, restricted development of
their five-acre tract of land to the construction of not more than
five single-family residences. The Court found that the ordinances
did substantially advance a legitimate state interest, as "exercises
of the city's police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from
the ill effects of urbanization."' 1 21 Furthermore, the ordinances limited but did not entirely preclude the "best use" of the land, nor

112. The Supreme Court decided Penn Central in 1978 and KaiserAetna on December
4, 1979, 15 days before the First District issued its opinion in Estuary Properties.
113. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
114. Id. at 260.
115. A corollary issue is whether repeated denials in a circular permitting process could
amount to a taking; another issue posed by the First District's disposition of Estuary
Properties is whether the court properly limited the state's options by precluding the possibility of replacing the excessive restrictions with more reasonable regulation, thus reversing
the confiscatory effects. The Court disposed of Agins by determining that no taking had
occurred, thereby avoiding the need to decide the related issue of whether a state could
preserve that option, in effect, by limiting an owner's possible remedies to invalidation of
the regulation and mandamus against its enforcement. Id. at 263.
116. Id. at 260 (citing Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
117. Id. (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 & n.36).
118. Id. (citing Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164); see Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
119. Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
120. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65302(a) & (e) (West Supp. 1979).
121. 447 U.S. at 261.
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did they "extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership, '2 2
since the landowners could still build as many as five houses on the
land if they wished.
Although the Court made a passing nod to the "diminution-invalue" test for a taking, " it emphasized that these ordinances
were nondiscriminatory and part of a general zoning plan that
would provide the benefits of orderly development and open
spaces-benefits that must be weighed along with any diminution
in value of the private property affected. Not surprisingly, the
Court upheld the ordinances as fair and facially valid regulations,"" emphasizing that the landowners retained the freedom "to
pursue their reasonable investment expectations"'2' by applying
for permission to develop their property within the limits allowed
by the ordinance. In Penn Central the Court had also stressed that
the regulation under attack permitted the landowner a "reasonable
beneficial use" of the property and a " 'reasonable return' on its
investment."' 26 After Agins, the Court's subjective measure of the
reasonableness of an owner's investment expectations that have
been injured by a challenged regulation will probably weigh heavily
in its determination of the regulation's validity. The clear inference from this proposition is that if the Court views an owner's
investment expectations as unreasonable, it will hold that even a
regulation entirely destroying those expectations does not amount
27
to a taking.1

2.

TAKING AND THE PERMITTING PROCESS: A CRITIQUE OF

Estuary

Properties
a.

Summary of the Case

In Graham v. Estuary Properties,Inc. the Florida Supreme
Court reversed the finding of the District Court of Appeal, First
District, that the state had taken land owned by Estuary Properties (Estuary) when it rejected Estuary's application for develop8
ment without identifying the modifications needed for approval."1
Estuary had acquired the "Windsor Tract" (mostly wetlands) by
122. Id. at 262.
123. Id.; see note 80 supra.

124. Id. at 259, 262-63.
125. Id. at 262.
126.
127.
128.
ties, Inc.

438 U.S. at 136, 138.
See also note 79 supra, discussing the recent San Diego decision.
Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (1981), rev'g Estuary Properv. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
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assignment from Windsor, who had reached an agreement in 1970
with the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of Florida;1 "
the agreement set the boundary between state land and the Windsor Tract and provided that the Trustees would not object to the
granting of a bulkhead line and various specified dredge-and-fill
permits to Windsor or his assigns upon application.180 Estuary
then bought lands next to the Windsor Tract, expanding its holdings to about 6,000 acres, and sought permission to commence developing a DRI of "some 26,500 residential units to accomodate
73,500 people. ' "
Estuary's ambitious plan proposed to preserve water quality
by building an interceptor waterway along the seaward side of a
natural levee (only about six to eight inches above the rest of the
land) on the property that separated a large coastal forest of red
mangroves from a somewhat smaller black mangrove forest between the coast and the uplands.18 ' Although Estuary intended to
build the development on the site of the black mangrove forest as
well as on the uplands, the company argued that the interceptor
waterway and a system of twenty-seven lakes (dredged to provide
fill for the development) would perform the draining and cleaning
functions presently performed by the black mangroves." 8
The Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council 1" had recommended denial of the DRI application, emphasizing that the
proposal omitted some data needed for the crucial determination
of whether the proposed drainage system would in fact function
properly. The Council noted that no one had ever tested such a
system "in actual usage . .. [or in] a pilot project of suitable
scale"1" and that the proposal failed to take into account "the
129. Under chapter 253 of the Florida Statutes (1981), the Governor and the Cabinet
manage the preservation, acquisition, and disposition of state land in their capacity as the

Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of Florida.
130. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1129, 1131-32.
134. Under the Environmental Land and Water Management Act, an applicant for a

DRI permit must file an application with the local government that has jurisdiction over the
proposed development, FLA. STAT. § 380.06(6) (1979) (amended by 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80313, § 3), as well as with the appropriate regional planning agency or council, FLA. STAT. §

380.06(7)(b) (1979) (amended and renumbered as § 380.06(9)(b) by 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80313, § 3) (formerly by implication and practice; now expressly required as concurrent filing).
See notes 233-34 and accompanying text infra. See also T. PELHAM, STATE LAND-USE PLANNING AND REGULATION at 36-44 (1979).
135. Estuary Properties,381 So. 2d at 1129.
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complex mix of firban effluents that would be entering the
waterways."'186
The Board of County Commissioners of Lee County then held
several public hearings, eventually adopting the findings of the
planning council and denying the application and the requested rezoning. 13 7 Listing numerous reasons for the denial, the Board
called attention to the unpredictable but highly risky detrimental
impact on the environment that the proposed development could
cause, as well as virtually certain impacts on the transportation
and education systems of the county and the tourist and commercial fishing industries in the area. The County Board, however,
did specify what changes were necessary to make the application
eligible for approval. 8 Essentially, the Board would have required
Estuary to reduce the size of the proposed development by about
one-half and to provide greater assurance of preserving water quality by planning for an adequate sewage treatment system (that the
county would construct and operate) instead of the interceptor waterway. The Board also insisted that Estuary eliminate its proposed "destruction of large acreages of red and black mangroves"' 3 9 and include "a proposal to aid Lee County in funding
the cost of the [other] impact[s] the proposed development will
0

have.",14

4
After Estuary appealed to the Adjudicatory Commission,' '
the Commission appointed a hearing officer to consider the application de novo and make new findings and conclusions. The hearing officer found, in general, that although the development would
not have a more adverse impact on the county's economy and environment than any other similar development, the specific destruction of the black mangroves would have a special adverse effect,
since the preponderance of the evidence showed that the proposed
interceptor waterway would not effectively prevent the deterioration of the water quality in the surrounding bays. 4 " At the same

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1130-31. The statute (ELWMA) requires specification of such changes. See
FLA. STAT. § 380.08(3) (1981).
139. 381 So. 2d at 1131 (emphasis by the court deleted).
140. Id. at 1130.
141. The Governor and the Cabinet sit as the Adjudicatory Commission in their role as
settlors of disputes over the granting or denial of permits. See FLA. STAT. § 380.07 (1981). In
their capacity as promulgators of standards and guidelines under ELWMA, the Governor
and the Cabinet act as the Administration Commission. See id. § 380.031(1).
142. 381 So. 2d at 1131-32.
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time, however, the hearing officer noted that some of the reasons
the County Board gave for rejecting the application would be unreasonable restrictions on Estuary's use of the land. For example,
the Board's requirement of a funding proposal was unprecedented,
since impact fees had never been required from any other developer.'4 3 Nevertheless, the hearing officer recommended denial of
the application without suggesting possible changes that would
make it eligible for approval. Adopting the hearing officer's recommended order, the Adjudicatory Commission denied the application, similarly failing to suggest the changes necessary to make the
development permissible, as required by section 380.08(3) of the
44
Florida Statutes.'
Estuary sought judicial review as provided by ELWMA.' 4 5 The
First District held in favor of Estuary on almost all counts, openly
declaring that it was following Estuary's framing of the issues and
phrasing of the conclusions. 46 At the outset, the court discussed at
length, but did not decide, the validity of Estuary's assertion that
the denial of the application had violated chapter 380 of the Florida Statutes because the evidence did not support the hearing officer's conclusion that the "removal" of the mangroves would harm
the quality of water in the area.' 47 The court then held first that
the permitting authorities had failed to balance the potential costs
and benefits of the proposed development, and had instead imposed an unfair ultimate burden of proof on Estuary by requiring
extensive testing and documentation to demonstrate that no adverse impact on the environment would occur, a burden of proof
neither justified by the statute nor permissible under the Constitution.1 48 Second, the court held that the Commission had failed to
explain how Estuary could have changed the proposal to make it
eligible for approval, thus violating the mandate of ELWMA.' 4 9
Next, the court agreed with Estuary that the denial of the DRI
permit amounted to a taking without compensation. ' 50 The court
then abstained from deciding Estuary's constitutional challenge of
section 380.06(8) of the Florida Statutes on grounds of vagueness
143. Id. at 1132.
144. FLA. STAT. § 380.08(3) (1981).
145. The district court cited § 380.07(5) of the Florida Statutes, which the Florida Legislature amended in 1978.
146. 381 So. 2d at 1132.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1134, 1137.
149. Id. at 1137; see FLA. STAT. § 380.08(3) (1981).
150. 381 So. 2d at 1140.
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and improper delegation, and ordered the Adjudicatory Commission either to grant the permit or to begin condemnation
proceedings.151
b. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Adjudicatory Commission and Lee County petitioned the
Florida Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the case. 152
"Inpartially reversing and partially affirming the First District's decision, the supreme court divided its opinion into two parts: First,
the court discussed Estuary's allegation that the permit denial violated chapter 380 of the FloridaStatutes; second, the court considered whether the denial constituted a taking of private property
for public use without payment of just compensation.'" The court
agreed with the First District that the legislative intent behind
chapter 380 requires that an agency balance both the state's interest in protecting the public health, safety, and welfare, and the
landowner's interest in constitutionally protected private property.154 But the court disagreed with the lower court's decision that
because the Adjudicatory Commission had denied DRI approval
despite finding favorably for Estuary on four of the six requisite
considerations, the agency had not properly balanced those considerations. 155 Because the legislature did not place specific values on
each consideration, "it would have been permissible for the hearing
officer to determine that the adverse environmental impact and
deviation from the policies of the planning council outweighed the
other more favorable findings."" The supreme court cited Askew
v. Cross Key Waterways 57 for the proposition that flexibility was
essential to the administrative process. Citing FloridaState Board
of Architecture v. Wasserman,1 the court also emphasized that
the agency may exercise discretion when balancing applicable
1 59
considerations.

The supreme court next overruled the First District's decision
that forcing the landowner to prove the absence of adverse envi151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
399 So. 2d at 1377.
Id. at 1377, 1380.
Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1378.
Id.
372 So. 2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978).
377 So. 2d 653, 656 (Fla. 1979).
Estuary Properties,399 So. 2d at 1378.
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ronmental impact constituted an unconstitutional burden of
proof. 160 After factually distinguishing Zabel v. Pinellas County
Water & Navigational Control Authority,'6 ' on which the First
District had relied, the court stated that "Zabel stands for the proposition that the burden is on the state to show that an adverse
impact will result if a permit is granted."' 6 After the state shows a
potential adverse impact, the burden of proof shifts to the property owner to prove that curative measures will be adequate.'63 In
placing the initial burden on the state to show that a proposed
DRI will have an adverse impact, the court stated that it was not
ignoring or altering the established rule that one seeking administrative relief carries the burden of proof, but that it was simply
reaffirming that the "exercise of the state's police power must relate to the health, safety, and welfare of the public and may not be
arbitrarily and capriciously applied."' 6' The court found that the
state had clearly met its burden and that there was competent,
substantial evidence to support the agency's finding that the curative measures would not be adequate. Although the evidence
might have supported an opposite conclusion, the court refused to
substitute its judgment for the agency's, and accordingly held
"that the district court incorrectly reversed the adjudicatory commission's finding that the proposed DRI would have an adverse
impact.""'6 In fact, however, the district court had avoided the necessity of reversing the agency's finding on the gound of insufficient evidence, relying instead on the agency's improper allocation
of the burden of proof. '66
The supreme court agreed with the First District that the
hearing officer and the Adjudicatory Commission had improperly
failed to include specific changes that would allow the development
to go forward. 167 The court also noted that the hearing officer
deemed some of the Council's recommendations "so vague and indefinite that it [is] doubtful that Estuary could ascertain what it
would be required to do to obtain approval."' 68 But the supreme
court characterized the agency's failure to indicate the requisite
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 1379.
171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965).
Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1379. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See 381 So. 2d at 1134, 1137.
399 So. 2d at 1380.
Id. (quoting Estuary Properties,381 So. 2d at 1132) (brackets by supreme court).
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changes as a mere procedural error that impaired the fairness of
the proceeding. 6 9 The court therefore remanded the case to the
district court with directions to remand for further agency
70
proceedings.1
In reversing the First District's finding of a taking, the court
noted several factors to be considered: (1) whether there had been
a physical invasion; (2) whether the result was a reduction in value
or the denial of "all economically reasonable use"; (3) whether the
regulation created a public benefit or prevented a public harm; (4)
whether the regulation was consistent with the police power; (5)
whether it was arbitrary and capricious; and (6) whether the property owner had investment-backed expectations to use its property.' 7 ' Three of these, however, were central to the opinion: The
harm-benefit test, the denial of reasonable use, and the investment-backed expectations of the property owner.
Another important aspect of the decision was the court's
agreement with observations made in a Wisconsin decision, Just v.
Marinette County, 72 which concluded that "[a]n owner of land
has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural
character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was
unsuited in its natural state and which [injures] the rights of
others.' 78 Noting the "sensitive nature" of Estuary's lands, the
Supreme Court of Florida stated that the denial of development
approval sought the prevention of a public harm, which made it a
reasonable exercise of police power. 7 4 The court observed: "It is
true that the public benefits in that the bays will remain clean, but
75
that is a benefit in the form of maintaining the status quo.'
In addition to this analysis, the court focused on the extent of
the resulting reduction in value and denial of use of Estuary's
property. The hearing officer had not heard the taking issue, so
there was no real evidence on record going to these questions. 176
The court discussed the lack of evidence and decided that, by it169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1380-81.
172. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
173. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1382 (quoting Just, 56 Wis. 2d at 17, 201
N.W.2d at 768) (emphasis added). Note that without the emphasized portion this statement
would mislead. The attempt by government to preserve existing public benefits from private
land may still amount to a taking, absent the need to prevent harm to the public. See San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego. 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (all three opinions).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Estuary Properties,381 So. 2d at 1131.
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self, the reduction of the development by half did not establish a
taking: "We ... hold that, under the facts as found by the commission, the instant reduction is a valid exercise of the police
power."' 17 7 There having been a valid exercise of the police power,

and no evidence of reduced value or lost use, the court held that no
17 8
taking had occurred.

One commentator hailed the First District's decision in Estuary Properties as "a potential watershed

. . .

in the development

of the Florida DRI process.' 79 The supreme court's reversal
should have even more significant impacts on land use and environmental law in Florida. These impacts cannot now be accurately
predicted, however, because the supreme court left several key
questions unanswered.
c. The Issue of the Burden of Proof
One reason why the supreme court reversed the First District
in Estuary Properties was that it disagreed with the First District's handling of the burden of proof issue. 80 Relying on Zabel'8
and Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea 5s' the First District implicitly
placed the ultimate burden of proof on the state, starting with the
premise that the state was required to prove that the property
177. Estuary Properties,399 So. 2d at 1382. The court also considered Estuary's in-

vestment-backed expectations for use of the property and, distinguishing the case from
Zabel and Gables-By-The-Sea, stated that Estuary "had only its subjective expectation

that the land could be developed in the manner it now proposes." Id. at 1383 (emphasis
supplied). Interestingly, the supreme court failed to discuss or even mention the mean high
water line, which traditionally has been recognized as the boundary line between private
ownership rights and public interests. See Borax Consol. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10
(1935); United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976); Trustees
of Internal Improvement Fund v. Wetstone, 222 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1969); Florida Board of
Trustees of InternalImprovement Trust Fund v. Wakulla Silver Springs Co., 362 So. 2d

706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Instead, the court focused on wetlands in its discussion of the
public interest in preserving the environment and apparently did not consider Estuary's
expectation of being able to use its property landward of mean high water consistently with
traditional Florida property law.
Note that Justice Adkins dissented, urging that Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in
San Diego Gas controlled the decision in Estuary Properties. 399 So. 2d at 1383. Justice

Adkins viewed the denial of DRI approval as depriving "Estuary of the beneficial use of
almost three-quarters of its property," to preserve a public benefit from the mangroves. Id.

at 1384-85. He did not address the issue of the public harm that removal of the mangroves
would cause.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

399 So. 2d at 1382.
T. PELHAM, supra note 134, at 62.
Estuary Properties,399 So. 2d at 1379.
171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965).
333 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
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owner was not entitled to use its property in the proposed way."'
After balancing all evidence, the court held that the state had
failed to carry its burden.184
Distinguishing Zabel and Gables-By-The-Sea, however, the
supreme court decided that the state needs to make only a prima
facie case that the proposed development plans will have some adverse environmental effect before the owner must come forward
with evidence of effective curative measures. 85 The supreme court
found sufficient evidence in the record to uphold the state's initial
finding of adverse environmental impact, and refused to substitute
its judgment for that of the agency that the property owner had
not provided sufficient countervailing evidence.186
The supreme court's decision that under chapter 380 the burden is initially on the state to make a prima facie case of adverse
environmental impact, and then shifts to the owner to establish
curative measures, is fair and reasonable, but only so far as it goes:
The supreme court did not expressly determine which party has
the ultimate burden of proof. In any evidentiary trial, there are
two types of burdens of proof: The first and most important is the
burden of persuasion, by which a trier of fact weighs all evidence
and determines which party has established its case, under the applicable standard of proof: by a preponderance of the evidence,
clear and convincing evidence, or beyond all reasonable doubt."8 "
In contrast, the burden of producing evidence changes constantly
during trial. One party has the initial burden of showing a prima
facie case, after which the adverse party must come forward with
evidence rebutting the prima facie case, and so on throughout the
trial.1 88 The decision in the case does not necessarily go to the
party that ended with effective countering evidence but depends
on whether the party with the burden of persuasion has met that
burden.189
183. Estuary Properties,381 So. 2d at 1136-37.
184. Id. at 1137.
185. Estuary Properties,399 So. 2d at 1379.

186. Id.
187. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336 (2d ed. 1972).
188. Id.
189. Id. The First District recently discussed this distinction in Florida Dep't of
Transp. v. J.W.C. Co., 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). But the J.W.C. case arose under
chapter 403 of the Florida Statutes and differs from cases like Estuary Properties arising
under chapter 380. Part I of chapter 403, the "Florida Air and Water Pollution Control
Act," in effect establishes a presumption that polluting activities will adversely affect the
public interest. Because of that presumption, the ultimate burden of proof appropriately
rests on the applicant for a permit, as was the situation in J. W.C. Under chapter 380, on the
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One problem with the supreme court's decision is its confusing
treatment of the burden of proof. Although the court suggested
that Estuary had not met its "burden," 190 the court failed to identify clearly which of the two kinds of burdens it meant. If it was
referring to the burden of producing evidence, then the decision
creates little controversy. Requiring a property owner to come forward with countervailing evidence after the state has properly established that a proposed development will create significant adverse environmental impacts is a fair and reasonable restriction on
the use of property. Requiring the property owner to carry the burden of persuasion on that issue, however, would have the questionable effect of creating a presumption against the free and reasonable use of property. Since the court referred to a burden which
"shifted to Estuary," 91 the court may have meant the burden of
producing evidence. Alternatively, the court may have simply allocated the burden of persuasion to each party on different issues.
The state had met that burden by proving that the development
would cause an adverse impact. Estuary then had the ultimate
burden of proving that its curative measures were adequate, in
view of the proven potential impact. Despite the apparent fairness
of this putative allocation, however, there is no evidence that the
agency so allocated the burden of proof. To the contrary, the Adjudicatory Commission adopted the order and findings of the hearing
officer, who seemed to have assigned the burden of persuasion to
Estuary on both of the intertwined issues of impact and curative
measures."9 2 Thus, the objection stands.
d.

The Bureaucratic Revolving Door

The district court in Estuary Properties highlighted a takings
issue of growing importance: whether repeated denials of permits
each time on differing grounds can eventually amount to a taking
of the affected property. It is in the public interest that the development approval process have a clear point of termination. Although comprehensive environmental regulation is essential, excesother hand, the legislature established a scheme through which local governments consider

and balance both the positive and negative impacts of development, so that no presumption
of adverse impact can be inferred. Under chapter 380, therefore, it would be inappropriate.
to place on a property owner the ultimate burden of proving no adverse environmental
impacts.
190. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1379.
191. Id.
192. 381 So. 2d at 1131-32.
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sive and circular permitting is costly and ultimately harms the
public. The First District recognized this problem when it decried
what it called the "treadmill effect": "The potential for abuse...
is readily apparent. County commissioners and the Adjudicatory
Commission could entrap a developer in a virtual bureaucratic revolving door, until he finally collapses from financial exhaustion, or
withdraws his application from simple frustration."' '93
Regulatory risk has become a substantial factor in the scarcity
of affordable, desirable planned communities and residential home
sites. Beyond the considerable expense the developer will necessarily incur by repeated submittals to local and state agencies, the
developer must constantly reconsider the economic risk of never
receiving a permit. Lenders and investors require some degree of
certainty before risking their capital. They are unlikely to do this
if the developer is trapped in an endless regulatory circle. The "revolving door" to which the district court referred can do more than
just revolve; it can destroy any chance of financing a new
community.
In Estuary Properties the supreme court did not address this
aspect of the case, probably because the facts did not squarely present the issue, since Estuary had suffered only one round of denials
of a development permit. Cases in other jurisdictions, however,
have expressed a concern similar to that of the First District. For
example, the Court of Appeals of New York in Spears v. Berle'
stressed that when a statute gives a permitting authority the discretion to grant permits for uses other than those listed in the statute, an applicant facing a possible denial of a permit "should be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain notice of the uses, if
any""9 5 that would be permissible. Furthermore, in some circumstances a court should even require the permitting authority to indicate unlisted but permissible uses, although this affirmative relief
still would stop short of mandating the grant of a permit, as the
district court required in Estuary Properties.Otherwise, the court
in Spears implied, the delays caused by official reticence might
amount to a taking.' 9 6 In contrast, the Supreme Court of Connecti193. Estuary Properties, 381 So. 2d at 1137.
194. 48 N.Y.2d 254, 397 N.E.2d 1304, 422 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1979).
195. Id. at 264 n.4, 397 N.E.2d at 1308 n.4, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 640 n.4.
196. 48 N.Y.2d at 264 n.4, 397 N.E.2d at 1308, n.4, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 640 n.4. The Spears
court stated that under the New York test for a taking by regulation, "a land use regulation
. . .is deemed too onerous when it 'renders the property unsuitable for any reasonable income[,] productive or other private use for which it is adapted and thus destroys its economic value, or all but a bare residue of its value .. '"Id. at 262, 397 N.E.2d at 1307, 422
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cut suggested in Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Commissioner of Environmental Protection 97 that the denial of a specific application for
a permit does not automatically require the finding of a taking,
because "[s]hort of regulation which finally restricts the use of
property for any reasonable purpose resulting in a 'practical confiscation,' the determination of whether a taking has occurred must"
rest on a traditional balancing approach.'""
There is no apparent reason why a court should not consider
the detrimental impact on property caused by dilatory official ac-'
tion, along with other relevant factors, in deciding takings issues.
Recently, Justice Brennan suggested that "interim damages" be
awarded for the duration of a regulatory taking. 99 Perhaps by labelling this statutory violation of chapter 380 as a "treadmill effect," the First District in Estuary Properties will discourage "repeated denials without any indication from governmental agencies
of changes in [an applicant's] proposal that would permit an economically beneficial use of his property. 2 0 0 The statutory violation
could escalate into an unconstitutional taking. The quantitative
measure of the delay and its resultant harm may properly trigger a
qualitative classification that receives special weight in an overall
balancing.2 1 But the label for the qualitative category (the "treadmill effect") should not be misread as a dispositive litmus test for a
taking.
As noted previously, the factual context of Estuary Properties
dissipated the force of the important policy that the law must discourage officials from deliberate nondisclosure of modifications
that are necessary to make the proposed development permissible.
Although the First District correctly noted that section 380.08(3)
N.Y.S.2d at 639 (quoting from Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587,
596, 350 N.E.2d 381, 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 10, cert. denied & appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990
(1976)) (brackets contained in Spears opinion). As the Supreme Court has emphasized in
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31, the Spears court declared that an owner seeking to establish that a regulation has taken his property must show "that under no permissible use
would the parcel as a whole be capable of producing a reasonable return or be adaptable to
other suitable private use. . . ." 48 N.Y.2d at 263, 397 N.E.2d at 1308, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
See also Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Chadwick, 405 A.2d 241
(Md. 1979) (deferral of subdivision approval held a taking); City of Austin v. Teague, 570
S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978) (city liable for damages caused by its arbitrary and wrongful denial
of waterway permits).
197. 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948 (1975).
198. Id. at 356, 363 A.2d at 952 (emphasis added).

199. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. at 636 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
200. 381 So.2d at 1137.
201. See notes 81-92 and accompanying text supra.
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of the Florida Statutes"' requires any agency denying a permit to
specify whatever changes in the application would make it eligible
for approval, it is not entirely true that Estuary was "left to wonder what changes" were necessary. 203 The hearing officer had specified the precise reasons for his recommended rejection of the application; the County Board had indicated in great detail what
changes it would require. In this context, regardless of the wording
of the Commission's final order, Estuary knew that a drastically
reduced and better documented proposal would stand a good
chance of approval by the Commission. The supreme court was
also troubled by the Commission's failure to comply with the statute. The court stated that although "the commission [may have]
intended to adopt the changes specified by the planning council
20 4
. . .the commission's order should have expressly so indicated.
Because the order did not so indicate, the supreme court remanded
to the district court with instructions to remand, in turn, to the
Commission for an indication of the changes necessary for
20 5
approval.
Finally, the prematurity of presuming that Florida courts now
may be ready to find "treadmill" regulatory takings is suggested by
the First District's failure to show how a single denial (and the
affirmance of that denial on review) of this specific permit could
result in a treadmill effect, let alone constitute a permanent taking20 of private property under the proper balancing test. The
First District itself later emphasized the requirement of permanency in the taking in Department of Transportation v. Burnette2 ° In Estuary Properties, however, it instead stressed the
policy underlying the takings law-namely, that the public must
202.

FLA. STAT.

§ 380.08(3) (1981).

203. 381 So. 2d at 1137.
204. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1380.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d 56, 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
(per ,curiam opinion) (quoting and adopting the trial court's opinion that taking must be
permanent). Of course, the First District stopped short of holding that the denials of Estuary's permit had amounted to a treadmill constituting a regulatory taking.
207. 384 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In Burnette, the Department of Transportation had reversed the drainage flow from State Road 10, which potentially could cause the
flooding of about half the acreage of Burnette's property "once every 25 years, on the average, as the result of a '25-year six-hour storm'." Id. at 919. The court chose to affirm the
grant of injunctive relief against maintenance of the drainage system, but did so on the tort
ground of a continuing nuisance, rather than "attenuate the 'taking' concept by finding a
(compensable) taking rather than (incompensable) damage, as by holding that this raw acreage is 'permanently' appropriated because . . . half of it will be . . . intermittently and
wrongfully damaged by water." Id. at 922 (parentheticals in original).
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pay for the benefits it receives from the appropriation of private
property or from regulation that destroys the owner's beneficial
use of his property. 208 But only a prior finding of a permanent appropriation or destruction of the property implicates that policy.
Moreover, the court implicitly rejected the balancing method of
determining that a taking has occurred in favor of the "universally
accepted" principle that "the state may legitimately regulate wetlands development to achieve an efficient allocation of resources,
but it should ordinarily compensate landowners for wealth redistributions resulting from the regulation imposed." 0 9 The court
cited no case suggesting that this policy overrides the need of government to impose reasonable regulations without having to compensate owners for every significant deprivation of property
uses.2 10 The court seemed unaware that the policy of compensating
for reallocating wealth plays less of a role in determining whether a
taking has occurred than in pointing to the proper remedy once
the court has found a taking. But because the-district court did not
actually hold that a treadmill of denials had taken Estuary's property, the court's discussion of the treadmill effect is mere dictum,
with great potential significance not fulfilled by the facts of this
case. No wonder the supreme court responded to that dictum with
a resounding silence.
e.

The Supreme Court's Reliance on Just v. Marinette
County2 1 '

Another controversial aspect of the supreme court's decision
was its reliance on the Wisconsin Supreme Court's 1972 decision in
Just v. Marinette County.2 12 In Just, the local government had enacted an ordinance requiring permits for dredging and filling activities in sensitive environmental areas.2 1 3 Subsequent to the enactment of the ordinance, the Justs, who owned acreage in an
208. 381 So. 2d at 1139. The court refused to balance the public benefits against the
private injury-or any other factors, for that matter-because it viewed the Commission's
categorical denial of the requested permit as (automatically and categorically qualifying as a
taking of Estuary's property, depriving it of the possibility of making "any economically
beneficial use of its land." Id. (emphasis added).
209. Id. (quoting Note, State and Local Wetlands Regulation: The Problem of Taking
Without Just Compensation, 58 U. VA. L. REV. 876, 905-06 (1972)) (emphasis added by the
court).
210. See note 84 supra (comments of Holmes, J., in Pennsylvania Coal).
211. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 12, 201 N.W.2d at 765-66.
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environmentally sensitive area, proceeded to fill a portion without
first obtaining a permit.2 14 The county sued to enjoin this filling,
and the Justs defended on the ground that the ordinance caused a
21 5
taking of their property.
In its analysis of the alleged taking, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin refused to consider the land's potential for development
in determining its economic value, and instead focused on the economic value of the land in its natural state. 21 6' Reasoning that natural rather than economic uses were the status quo, and deciding
that development of the property would harm the environment,
the Wisconsin court determined that the purpose of the statute
and ordinance was the prevention of harm.21 7 Thus, relying on the
theory that statutes enacted to prevent public harm are valid exercises of the police power and not compensable, the court held that
the Justs were not entitled to compensation.2 18
Because of the court's reliance on the harm-benefit test and its
failure to consider economic value in the face of environmental
sensitivity, one commentator described Just as an example of
"doctrinal schizophrenia. ' 21 The main problem with the harmbenefit test arises from the absence of an objective method for determining whether a statute is aimed at preventing harm or securing a benefit.2 20 The Supreme Court of Florida apparently has
added this test to the balance of factors it will consider when deciding takings issues. The court recognized that "the line between
the prevention of a public harm and the creation of a public benefit is not often clear," since "the public benefits whenever a harm
is prevented. ' 22 1 Nevertheless, the court endorsed the use of this
somewhat slippery dichotomy that may lead to confusion in the
lower courts and further uncertainty among developers.
B.
In

Legislative Streamlining of DRI Review

1980, the Florida

Legislature

substantially

amended

214. Id. at 14, 201 N.W.2d at 766.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 23, 201 N.W.2d at 771.
217. Id. at 16-17, 201 N.W.2d at 768-69.
218. Id. at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 769.
219. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accomodation Power: Antidotes for the
Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021, 1047-48 (1975).
220. Id.; Michelman, supra note 80. For example, a statute preventing the placement of
billboards along the sides of highways simultaneously prevents the harm of blighting the
landscape and also secures the benefit of an unrestricted view.
221. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1382.
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ELMWA,222 perhaps in part to avoid the problem of circular permitting and the risk of results foreshadowed by the First District's
decision in Estuary Properties.Among 'other things, the legislation
provided a procedure for the monitoring and approval of urban renewal or development projects undertaken by a downtown development authority223 and established an experimental program for
reviewing proposed development in Dade County for one year.2 2
Another provision of the amending act 22 8 repealed former section

380.10 of the Florida Statutes. 226 That section, in part, had authorized the Administration Commission to make emergency changes
in the standards and guidelines relating to developments of regional impact, which would be effective immediately but subject to
the subsequent approval or disapproval by the legislature.22 7 The

legislature now will assume tighter control over the adoption of
new standards and guidelines.2 2 Most importantly, the legislature
streamlined the review of proposed developments of regional impact, clarifying the roles of the regional planning agency, the local
government, and the developer,229 and providing an optional coordinated review conducted simultaneously by all affected
2s °
agencies.
222. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-313.
223. Id. §§ 1 & 3 (creating FLA. STAT. §§ 380.031(19) & 380.06(21)(a)-(d) (1981)).
224. Id. § 2 (amending FLA. STAT. § 380.032(3) (1979)).
225. Id. § 4 (repealing FLA. STAT. § 380.10 (1979)).
226. FLA. STAT. § 380.10 (1979) (repealed 1980).
227. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(2)(a) (1979) (amended 1980). Section 380.10 had required legislative approval of guidelines and standards adopted by the Administrative Commission
pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 380.06(2) (1979) (amended 1980). Section 380.06(2)(a) authorized
the Commission to "adopt guidelines and standards to be used in determining whether particular developments shall be presumed to be of regional impact." Id.
228. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-313, § 3 (amending FLA. STAT. § 380.06(2) (1979)).
229. See id., especially the amendments to FLA. STAT. §§ 380.06(3)-(4), (7)-(11), (14)(17), (20) & (22) (1979)).
230. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8) (1979) (as amended 1980).
The streamlining trend in Florida law is also evidenced by the recent enactment of
three statutes in which the legislature has placed all permitting control in one or two agencies. Pure "one-stop permitting" schemes, in which one lead agency coordinates and is responsible for all state and local permits, was established in the Florida Electrical Power
Plant Siting Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 403.501-.517 (1981) and the Transmission Line Siting Act,
FLA. STAT. §§ 403.52-.536 (1981). In the Florida Industrial Siting Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 288.501.518, (1981) one state agency coordinates all state permits, but necessary local approvals
(including chapter 380 development orders) are excluded from statutory coverage. Thus, the
Industrial Siting Act attempts to streamline the environmental permitting process for industry and simultaneously recognizes the important interests of the public in retaining local
control over industries that may have immediate and longlasting impacts on the community.
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CLARIFIED ROLES OF PARTICIPANTS

a. The Regional Planning Agency
The ELWMA amendments clarify and somewhat modify the
powers and duties of regional planning agencies and councils. Regional planning agencies now have the power to recommend for
adoption by the Department of Community Affairs not just the
kinds of development that should be designated as DR1231 but any
modifications to existing guidelines and standards.2 " To promote
general coordination of review, the amending act explicitly requires
a developer to submit applications for approval of proposed development to the state and the regional planning agencies at the same
time the developer files an application with the local government.2 " The statute previously prohibited local governments from
scheduling a public hearing on an application until the regional
planning agency determined that the application contained sufficient information,but the statute was otherwise silent on the subject of the timing of the three filings.3 4 A possible initial source of
delay appears in the provision giving the regional planning agency
thirty days to notify the developer and the local government if it
decides that the information supplied in the application is inadequate.2 5 Formerly, this period was fifteen days.2 36 This extension
of time, however, should enhance the accuracy of the agency's initial review and may ultimately avoid litigation over unnecessary
denials of DRI status, thereby increasing administrative efficiency
in the long run. Reinforcing this effort to improve the accuracy of
agency decision, new subsection (11)(b) authorizes the regional
planning agency to require other government agencies to submit
reports on applications.23
The amendments also modify and clarify the duties of regional
planning agencies. Formerly, the statute did not specify what criteria the agency should follow in reviewing proposed changes to pre231. Id. § 380.06(3).
232. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-313, § 3 (amending FLA. STAT. § 380.06(3) (1979)).
233. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 380.06(9)(a) (1979)).
234. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7)(a) (1979). Note that new subsection (9)(c) requires
agency to notify the local government that it may set the date for the hearing when
agency either "determines that the application is sufficient or ... receives" notice that
developer will not supply further information as requested. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-313,
(creating FLA. STAT. § 380.06(9)(c)) (1981).
235. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-313, § 3 (amending FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7)(b) (1979).
236. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7)(b) (1979) (amended 1980).
237. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-313, § 3 (creating FLA. STAT. § 380.06(11)(b) (1981).

the
the
the
§ 3
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viously approved DRI applications. As amended, subsection
380.06(4)(b)1 3 8 now requires the agency to apply the criteria listed
in new subsection (17)(b), 3 9 the same criteria specified for local
government review. The amending act also adds a new provision
that requires a developer to arrange a preapplication conference
with the regional planning agency. 4' At this conference the regional planning agency must supply the developer with information about the, reviewing "process and the use of preapplication
conferences to identify issues, coordinate appropriate state and local agency requirements, and otherwise promote a proper and efficient review of the proposed development. ' 241 With the same goal
of streamlining DRI review,"2' new subsection 380.06(7)(b) requires
that each regional planning agency establish a procedure for reaching "binding written agreements" between the developer and the

agency to eliminate irrelevant issues from consideration.2" The
amended act, by imposing certain duties on the regional planning
agency, suggests the issues that the agency should consider. The

agency not only must apply the general criteria formerly applicable
under ELWMA, " but also must "identify regional issues" in its
report to the local government on an application 4 " and develop a
list of such issues for reviewing all DRI applications.24' Because it
238. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(4)(b) (1979), as amended by 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-313, § 3.
239. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-313, § 3 (renumbering former FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7)(h)
(1979) as § 380.06(17)(b) (1981)).
240. Id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7)(a) (1981)).
241. Id.
242. The amendment contains this comment "It is the legislative intent of this subsection to encourage paperwork reduction, to discourage unnecessary data gathering and to
encourage the coordination of the development of regional impact review process with federal, state, and local environmental reviews when such reviews are required by law." Id.
(creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7)(b) (1981)).
243. Id.
244. See FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8) (1979) (amended 1980).
245. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-313, § 3 (amending and renumbering FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)
(1979) as § 380.06 (11)(a) (1981)).
246. Id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(22)(b) (1981)). This amendment limiting the
regional planning agency to identification and consideration of only regional issues supports
the authors' opinion that the legislature intended chapter 380 development orders to remain
legally separate and distinct from local governmental zoning decisions. Maintaining such a
distinction allows the local government to protect the substantial public interest in preserving local control of land use within its jurisdiction, while simultaneously compelling consideration of regionally significant issues created by developments of regional impact. For a
discussion supporting this opinion, see Kavanaugh, Florida Land & Water Management
Act: Local Decision Making and the DRI Process, 50 FLA. B.J. 459 (1981). Contra, Pelham,
The Regional General Welfare: Florida'sNeed For a Landmark Judicial Decision, 50 FLA.
B.J. 319 (1981).
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is more specific than the general criteria of former subsection (8)241 7
and is applied uniformly to all proposed developments of regional
impact within an agency's jurisdiction, the list of regional issues
should promote efficient review.
b.

The Local Government

The amending act underscores the importance of the local
government's role after the issuance of a development order. The
local government shall assume the primary responsibility "for
monitoring the development and enforcing the provisions of the
development order."2 " In other ways the amendments clarify or
modify the role of local government in the review of DRI applications. One change expands the number of local governments that
can review such applications. Local governments without zoning
ordinances formerly had no authority to undertake the review;
now, "a local government that has adopted subdivision regulations"2 9 will review any proposed DRI within its jurisdiction.250 As
part of that review, the local government must hold a hearing on
the application, now required to be a public hearing "recorded by
tape or a certified court reporter and made available for transcription at the expense of any interested party. 2 51 Furthermore, in its
notice of the hearing, the local government now must specify where
interested persons may review relevant information about the DRI
application.2 8 2 These changes should help ensure that residents in
an affected region raise informed objections early in the review
process, sharpening the issues and testing the sufficiency of the information provided with the application. Addressing issues of public interest early in the review process might avoid subsequent litigation, resulting in improved administrative efficiency. Such an
improvement should also result from the new requirement that
"local governments . . . issue development orders concurrently
with any other [applicable] local permits or development approvals. 2 58 Finally, the introduction of five specific guidelines for the
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8) (1979) (renumbered as § 380.06(11)(a) in 1980)).
1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-313, § 3 (creating FLA. STAT. § 380.06(15) (1981)).
Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 380.06(5)(a) (1979)).
Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 380.06(6) (1979)).
Id. (amending and renumbering FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7) (1979) as § 380.06(10)

(1981)).

252. Id. (amending and renumbering FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7)(c) (1979) as § 380.06(10)(b)
(1981)).
253. Id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(14)(b) (1981)).
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development order 254 should increase certainty and efficiency in
the monitoring process after the order's issuance.2 5
c.

The Developer

The amending act imposed several new duties on developers
and granted them several new rights. As noted above, new subsection 380.06(7)(a) requires a developer to arrange a preapplication
conference with the regional planning agency."" At the developer's
request, other agencies must take part in this conference and provide information on the processes of reviewing the application and
granting permits. 25 7 The thrust of such a consolidated pre-review

procedure is anti-adversarial, intended to curtail the pointless delays that result from serial reviewing25a by separate agencies whose
requirements change without notice or remain vague until specified
in a rejection. To the same effect is the new provision for a generally coordinated review process, discussed below.2 59 Even if the developer fails to opt for coordinated review, another amendment
prevents the developer from causing undue delay, by requiring the
developer to send copies of his DRI application to the regional and
state planning agencies concurrently with the filing of the application with the local government. 60
For developments initially approved under amended ELWMA,
after July 1, 1980, developers must record notices of a development
order's adoption or subsequent modification. 6 ' Furthermore, a developer who has received development approval must submit an
annual report on the DRI to the local government and all affected
agencies, or face a temporary suspension of the development order.26 These changes intensify the scrutiny a DRI must undergo
and shift to the developer some of the costs of monitoring the development. Developers no doubt will urge the promulgation of a
254. See id. (amending and renumbering FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7)(e) (1979) as §
380.06(14)(c) (1981)).
255. Note that even if another local jurisdiction annexes the property for the proposed
development, the annexing jurisdiction must issue a new development order equivalent to
the one granted by the local government formerly having jurisdiction over the proposed
development. See id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(14)(e) (1981)).
256. Id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7)(a) (1981)).
257. Id.
258. See notes 192-210 and accompanying text supra.
259. See 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-313, § 3 (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8) (1981));
notes 230-42 and accompanying text infra.
260. See 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-313, § 3 (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(9)(a) (1981)).
261. Id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(14)(d) (1981)).
262. Id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(16) (1981)).
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rule establishing a short form for reporting. on developments with
no substantial changes. 6 s Finally, assuming that a developer has
made no substantial changes in a development built in stages, but
requires approval of "incremental applications," review of the incremental applications will be limited to the information required
and the issues raised by the master development order." The
amending act thus emphasizes the importance of a carefully detailed master development order to ensure the effectiveness of such
2
accelerated incremental review. "
2.

OPTIONAL COORDINATED REVIEW

The most important right the amended act granted to the developer is the option to have all affected state agencies coordinate
their review of a proposed DRI."I Although the developer may
choose to have only some of the affected agencies participate in the
coordinated review, 2 6 7 the clear gain of speed and efficiency from
an all inclusive review process will probably outweigh any reason
for excluding an affected agency. The developer must exercise this
new option at the preapplication conference2 6 8 with the regional
planning agency, which will be responsible for coordinating the review by whatever agencies the developer selects." Central to this
new procedure is the idea that the regional planning agency will
encourage those agencies to develop coordinated schedules for permit processing and to conduct concurrent review 27 0 of applications
submitted simultaneously to all the agencies.27 1 To help ensure application approval on first review, the amending act allows the developer to ask agencies for a nonbinding identification of any
problems with the proposal that could require its modification or
result in the denial of permits.2 7 ' For the same purpose the regional planning agency may call for additional preapplication con263. Of course, if the developer plans (or has made) substantial deviations from the
approved proposal, new subsection (17)(a) applies. See id. (amended and renumbering FLA.
STAT. § 380.06(7)(g) (1979) as § 380.06(17)(a) (1981)).
264. Id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(20)(b)(2) (1981)).
265. See id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(20)(b)(1) (1981)).
266. See id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(a) (1981)).
267. Id.
268. See id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7)(a) (1981)); notes 205 & 220-22 and
accompanying text supra.
269. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-313, § 3 (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(d) (1981)).
270. See id.
271. See id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(e) (1981)).
272. See id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(c) (1981)).
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ferences1 7 ' The amending act also assists this goal by permitting
the developer and any of the agencies to reach a binding agreement on any of the following: (1) The agency's "jurisdiction over
the proposed development,

'274

(2) the agency rules that will affect

the review of the proposed DRI,2 " (3) the kinds of information
that each agency may require for approving the DRI application
and granting permits, 27 6 and (4) "[any other appropriate [subject
under] appropriate state or federal law or regulation." '27 Since the

coordinated review includes the processing required for issuing
permits that otherwise would follow the approval of the DRI application, and because the single DRI application now may serve "as
a substitute for permit data requirements or plans" in some circumstances,7 8 this new procedure should significantly reduce the
time and paperwork required before construction may begin.
IV.

CONCLUSION

From this selective sampling of recent developments in Florida environmental law, one may perceive an important though not
unwavering trend. Both the legislature and the courts have sought
to purge from the administrative process the delays due to fumbling or maneuvering by the applicants or the agencies, or by
would-be participants in the review of proposed development. Of
course, to change the law is to take risks. Removing bars to growth
may erode essential protections of the environment and rush the
state into unchecked development. But the careful recent streamlining of review procedures seems to avoid the opposing dangers of
economic stagnation and environmental disaster.
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See id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(d) (1981)).
Id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(b)(1) (1981)).
See id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(b)(1) (1981)).
See id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(b)(3) (1981)).
Id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(b)(4) (1981)).
See id. (creating new FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(d) (1981)).

